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Ethics, morality and the case for realist political theory 
 
Edward Hall and Matt Sleat, University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract 
A common trait of all realistic political theories is the rejection of a 
conception of political theory as applied moral philosophy and an attempt 
to preserve some form of distinctively political thinking. Yet the reasons 
for favouring such an account of political theory can vary, a point that has 
often been overlooked in recent discussions by realism's friends and critics 
alike. While a picture of realism as first-and-foremost an attempt to 
develop a more practical political theory which does not reduce morality 
to politics is often cited, in this paper we present an alternative 
understanding in which the motivation to embrace realism is grounded in 
a set of critiques of or attitudes towards moral philosophy which then feed 
into a series of political positions. Political realism, in this account, is 
driven by a set of philosophical concerns about the nature of ethics and 
the place of ethical thinking in our lives. We argue that this impulse is 
precisely what motivated Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss to their 
versions of distinctively realist political thought. This is important to 
emphasise, we argue, as it demonstrates that realism does not set politics 
against ethics (a misunderstanding typically endorsed by realism's critics) 
but is rather an attempt to philosophise about politics without relying on 
understandings of morality which we have little reason to endorse. 
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It is by now something of a platitude to remark that political realists 
resist the thought that political theory can be a form of applied moral 
philosophy and in so doing have the general ambition of preserving some 
autonomy for distinctively political thinking. However, while all those 
who have recently been involved in the renewed interest in some kind of 
realist political theorising share this commitment, their reasons for doing 
so vary. And the fact that realists have come to political realism via 
different intellectual routes is  frequently overlooked E\VRPHRIUHDOLVP·V
defenders but also by its many critics. While the different impulses that 
PRWLYDWHWKH¶UHDOLVWWXUQ·LQSROLWLFDOWKHRU\ ought not to be thought of as 
mutually exclusive, it is important to set them out independently from one 
another in order to adequately grasp the multifaceted nature of the 
contemporary realist current. Indeed, it is only when one truly 
understands what the different contemporary realist thinkers are trying to 
do that one can then begin to understand the distinctive contribution 
realism seeks to make to contemporary political theory ² and this is an 
important step if one is to critically engage with realism  on its own terms.   
One impulse that motivates some realists is that of developing a more 
practical political theory whose closer proximity to the real world of 
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politics, through a greater appreciation of feasibility constraints or 
sensitivity to the conditions of political possibility, makes it better suited 
as a guide to action for political agents as they actually are. From this 
perspective, the key failing of much contemporary political philosophy 
has been to abstract or idealise away too far from the real world, creating 
an unbridgeable gap between theory and practice.1  
A second, more philosophically nuanced, impulse stems from the 
thought that politics has a character that cannot be sufficiently subsumed 
by morality, especially the ethical thought appropriate for reflecting upon 
individual behaviour, either because politics pursues ends  that are 
sufficiently distinct from other areas of human life (such as order and 
stability), or because politics is inherently a collective rather than 
individual endeavour. Such a position does not pit politics against ethics 
but rather insists that there might be something appropriately called 
political ethics that is not simply the application of personal morality to 
the political sphere. This position does not commit realists to the thought 
that the demands of (non-political) morality have literally no place in 
politics, only that those demands do not have automatic or antecedent 
normative authority over political life. 
 Both of these motivations to realism stem from the basic thought that 
there is something specific about politics that needs to be reflected in any 
appropriately realistic political theory. Neither seek a political theory 
cleansed of all moral content, but it is clear that the impulse to both of 
these kinds of realism comes through a concern for recovering what is 
specifically political from the tendency to subsume politics into moral 
philosophy. Importantly, these forms of realism do not necessarily have 
anything to say about the subject matter of moral philosophy as 
traditionally conceived beyond their rejection of the idea that the 
prevailing modes of moral philosophising can be seamlessly applied to the 
political sphere. 
 There is another possible impulse to realism, one that comes more 
directly via moral philosophy and which is grounded in a related set of 
critiques of contemporary moral philosophy which then feed into a series 
of political positions that are recognisably realist. It is distinctive of this 
motivation to endorse political realism that it depends upon certain 
substantive attitudes and concerns within moral philosophy, or maybe 
more precisely attitudes towards moral philosophy from the perspective of 
the ethical more broadly conceived. On this impulse, political realism is 
driven by a set of philosophical concerns about the nature of ethics and 
the place of ethical thinking in our lives.2 
                                                                 
1 For such a reading see Valentini 2012. For scepticism that such 'non-ideal' theory 
ought to be understood as a form of realism see Sleat 2016. 
2  Some recent work engages in this endeavour of making explicit the ethical 
commitments or motivations behind realist political thought. See Hall 2014; Owen 
forthcoming; Nye 2015; Sagar 2016.  
3 
Forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
 
 These three different impulses have tended to be somewhat elided in the 
contemporary literature; not only by realism's critics. A familiar view of 
what realism is for tends to be some combination of the first two impulses 
² to create a more relevant political theory that does not reduce politics to 
morality. This is not necessarily mistaken but it is not the entire story, 
especially because the third perspective we have introduced is precisely 
the impulse that (even allowing for the differences between them) 
motivated both Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, the two most 
influential thinkers in contemporary realism, to versions of distinctively 
realist political thought. Though it is not wrong to think that Williams or 
Geuss were concerned about the issue of feasibility constraints, nor that 
they sought a more distinctively political form of thinking about politics, 
they arrived at those positions via the route of considerations that are 
properly thought of as part of ethical thought. 
 It is important to emphasise this now as confusion about what realism is 
for - why we need realist political thought - is to a large extent responsible 
for the frequent misunderstanding W\SLFDOO\HQGRUVHGE\UHDOLVP·VFULWLFV
that realism hankers for a political theory that eschews all ethical content. 
The impulse to realism that we wish to highlight here points rather to the 
fact that it's most recent instantiation in political theory grew out of 
specifically ethical concerns, and in particular the attempt to think 
philosophically about politics from a particular ethical standpoint. 3 
Realism on this reading does not set politics against ethics per se; instead it 
is an attempt to philosophise about politics without relying on 
understandings of morality which we have little reason to endorse. 
 
**** 
 
That there might be some uncertainty about what realism is for and the 
needs to which it responds will likely look strange given the quantity of 
survey articles that have already been published which address this 
question directly. But it might be that these are part of the problem. While 
Bernard Williams' In the Beginning was the Deed was published in 2005 and 
Raymond Geuss' Philosophy and Real Politics in 2008, it was the publication 
of William Galston's 'Realism in Political Theory' in 2010 that in many 
ways marked the start of the realist discussion in the discipline as whole. 
Galston's piece weaved together a myriad of otherwise very disparate 
theorists into a tapestry that could plausibly be called realist, and in doing 
so help set a research agenda for realism that it has largely followed since. 
Realism is presented 'as an alternate to ideal theory'; an attack on the 
'high-liberalism' of Rawls and Dworkin; a rejection of utopianism, 
moralism, hypothetical consent, universal principles and the priority of 
justice. According to Galston, realists urge us to focus on the 
distinctiveness of the political; the ways that institutions actually function; 
                                                                 
3 We are not attributing this intellectual impulse to all realists (either those who have 
been attributed the label or freely self-identify).  
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the motivations that people actually have; the importance of order and 
stability; the contingency of all political arrangements; the limits of 
political possibility; and the ubiquity of conflict and disagreement. What is 
realism for? It is, we are told, for correcting the excesses of ideal normative 
theorLVLQJ E\ GUDZLQJ RXU DWWHQWLRQ WR DQ ¶H[SHULHQFH-based concept of 
IHDVLELOLW\· *DOVWRQ 2010, 400-01) which will enable normative political 
theory to finally get the ear of policy makers and have the sort of 'impact' 
on the real world that it has long hankered for.  
 Since Galston's article there have been several further reviews or surveys 
of the realist literature, all of which carve the intellectual terrain up 
differently but generally stress something like this view of realism, and 
Williams and Geuss remain constant throughout as the intellectual 
figureheads of this movement in contemporary political theory.4 While we 
do not want to deny that Williams and Geuss deserve this place in the 
recent realist pantheon, their inclusion as advocates of this sort of realism is 
problematic. When Williams and Geuss were developing their respective 
realisms were they really developing it simply in order to construct a more 
politically feasible form of theorising, or was there a different intellectual 
impulse behind their turn to political realism?  
Speaking of Williams and Geuss together in this way necessarily 
overlooks some very significant differences between them. We do not 
wish to deny the existence of these and indeed will return to some of them 
later, but from a suitable level of generality they have much in common 
and it is this that we wish to focus on initially here. 5  They are 
unquestionably united in their deep scepticism, if not outright rejection, of 
most forms of modern moral philosophy, and certainly those we have 
inherited from Plato, Aristotle, Christianity, Kant and utilitarians such as 
Jeremy Bentham. This is sometimes the result of worries about specific 
features of these philosophies, such as Williams' charge that utilitarianism 
cannot make sense of the value of integrity or Geuss' worry that 
Kantianism misconceives of morality as a 'rule-guided activity'. 6 But often, 
and here they draw inspiration from Nietzsche whom both appreciated as 
a thinker of tremendous (if underappreciated) significance7 , they were 
                                                                 
4 See Baderin, 2014; Freeden, 2012; Philp, 2012; Rossi and Sleat, 2014; Runciman, 2012; 
Scheuerman, 2013.  
5 The differences between Williams and Geuss are often significant but this paper 
seeks to paint a big picture in little space, and we think that the commonalities are 
worth noting in order to elucidate our point that realism is not necessarily best 
understood in the terms in which it is often presented. 
6 See in particular, Geuss 2010b; 2005c and Williams 1993; 1973.    
7  :LOOLDPV IRU H[DPSOH ZULWLQJ LQ  GHFODUHG WKDW ¶,W LV FHUWDLQ HYHQ LI QRW
everyone has yet come to see it, that Nietzsche was the greatest moral philosopher of 
the past century. This was, above all, because he saw how totally problematical 
morality, as understood over many centuries, has become, and how complex a 
reaction that fact, when fuOO\XQGHUVWRRGUHTXLUHV· D*HXVVKDVZULWWHQD
large number of well -UHFHLYHG HVVD\V RQ 1LHW]VFKH·V WKRXJKW VHH HVSHFLDOO\ 
1997; 2005c; 2014b )RU :LOOLDPV·V NH\ GLVFXVVLRQV VHH :LOOLDPV D E F
2007d; and 2002 which is deeply indebted to Nietzsche in a number of ways.     
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concerned more with identifying the most basic and often shared but 
implicit assumptions of modern moral philosophy that gave it its 
problematic character ² especially insofar as it fails to make sense of the 
essential untidiness and complexities of our lived ethical experiences.8 So 
we find both Williams and Geuss rejecting the possibility of fully 
distinguishing the moral from a non-moral point of view; the thought that 
morality is best understood as the impartial application of rational 
principles; and doubting the overriding authority of rationality (and 
philosophy more generally) in human lives.9  
The philosophical import of these criticisms is best grasped by focusing 
on the distinction between ethics and morality Williams draws and his 
related rejection of ¶morality, WKH SHFXOLDU LQVWLWXWLRQ·; the unquestioned 
framework within which most contemporary philosophers approach the 
study of ethics. 0RUDOLW\ LV ¶DSDUWLFXODUGHYHORSPHQWRI WKHHWKLFDO·, one 
ZKLFK ¶HPSKDVL]HV FHUWDLQHWKLFDOQRWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQRWKHUV« DQG LWKDV
VRPHSHFXOLDUSUHVXSSRVLWLRQV·   In particular, Williams criticises 
the role that morality gives to the ideas of moral obligation and blame at 
the expense of other things such as our dispositions, moral sentiments, 
and the thick ethical concepts that give life meaning and purpose (1985, 
ch. 10). In addition, morality hopes to rescue moral value from 
contingency and this encourages it to emphasize a series of idealised 
FRQWUDVWV ¶EHWZHHQ IRUFHDQG UHDVRQSHUVXDVLRQDQG UDWLRQDO FRQYLFWLRQV
VKDPHDQGJXLOWGLVOLNHDQGGLVDSSURYDOPHUHUHMHFWLRQDQGEODPH·
194²5). Williams and Geuss both deny that the aspiration to achieve such a 
pure moral theory is coherent because they insist that we cannot study the 
VXEMHFWPDWWHURI HWKLFV ¶ZLWKRXW FRQVWDQWO\ ORFDWLQJ LWZLWKLQ WKH UHVWRI
KXPDQ OLIH DQG ZLWKRXW XQFHDVLQJO\ UHIOHFWLQJ RQ WKH UHODWLRQV RQH·V
claims have with history, sociology, ethnology, psychology and 
HFRQRPLFV· *HXVV   To this end :LOOLDPV KROGV DQG *HXVV·V
insistence that we must think outside the prevailing models of moral 
understanding shows that he agrees, that philosophers are mistaken in 
thinking that ¶PRUDOLW\MXVWLVWKHHWKLFDOLQDUDWLRQDOIRUP·DBy 
forgetting this, Williams alleges that morality has pernicious implications 
for ethical life because it ¶makes people think that without its very special 
obligation, there is only inclination; without its utter voluntariness, there is 
only force; without its ultimately pure justice, there is no justice · (1985, 
196).  
Neither Williams nor Geuss thought that their scepticism about modern 
moral philosophy implied some disabling moral scepticism or nihilism 
because neither thought philosophy stood in that sort of foundational role 
                                                                 
8 Insofar as Ancient Greek tragedy was 'realistic' in the sense that 'it is  about people 
(eventually) facing up to the dire situations in which they actually find themselves 
without flinching and making difficult choices', Geuss  insists that 'Philosophy is not 
the "natural" successor of tragedy but, if anything, of comedy. It is a kind of comedy 
without the humour·H 
9 Williams, 1985, ch. 4 and 1981. See also Geuss, 2010b.  
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to ethical life. Rather, ethics is a deeply socially embedded and practical 
activity: a matter of acting in accordance with a set of internalized 
GLVSRVLWLRQV ZKLFK DUH WKH UHVXOW RI D ¶YHU\ FRPSOH[ KLVWRULFDO GHSRVLW·
(Williams 1995b, 189). AOWKRXJKSKLORVRSK\LVGHYRLGRIWKHVRUWRI¶IRUFH·
that might compel someone to act in the ways that many philosophers 
insist morality demands, it does not obviously follow that this recognition 
must unseat our ethical dispositions and sentiments. Yet because there is, 
LQ:LOOLDPV·V WHUPLQRORJ\QR´$UFKLPHGHDQ3RLQWµ IURP ZKLFKZHFDQ
argue the amoralist into moral life10, we ought to accept that philosophy, if 
it can be of any help at all, has to start from within moral experience and 
so cannot ground it. 11  The aim of moral philosophy is 'to sharpen 
perception, to make one more acutely and honestly aware of what one is 
saying, thinking and feeling' (Williams 1993, xv). What philosophy cannot 
claim to do is to provide a perspective from which we are able to 
transcend our history and experience to rationally validate particular 
moral practices because WKHUH LVQR ¶DEVROXWLVW3ODWRQLF FRQFHSWLRQRI WKH
ZRUOG·from which we can make such judgements (Geuss 2005a, 4). In this 
sense, no moral philosophy is going to do the sort of justificatory work 
that has so often been demanded of it. However, philosophical reflection 
can aid self-understanding by helping us to appreciate where our 
commitments and values might be the result of self-deception, 
metaphysical illusions, or social deceit. This kind of self-understanding 
undermines certain intellectualised pictures of ethics and this has 
important ramifications for practice because PRUDOLW\ ¶LV a deeply rooted 
and still powerful misconception of life·:LOOLDPV196).12  
Williams and Geuss are not alone in contemporary philosophy in their 
holding out little hope for a philosophical understanding of morality that 
can provide  an ultimate justification of a particular form of ethical life or a 
VHWRI¶XQLYHUVDO·PRUDOSUinciples. Acknowledging the socially embedded 
QDWXUHRIPRUDO WKLQNLQJ VKRXOG OHDGXV WRDFNQRZOHGJH WKDW ¶ZHGRQRW
                                                                 
10 Williams 1985, ch. 2 and 1993, ch. 1. 
11  This is why Williams is adamant that 'one's initial responsibilities [when 
approaching moral philosophy] should be to moral phenomena, as grasped in one's 
own experience and imagination', (1993, xxi). 
12 For Williams the most important ramification being an unmasking of the alienating 
moral perspectives the morality system favours which encourage us to experience 
ethical life in terms of fulfilling obligations (Williams 1985, ch. 10). The other key 
LPSOLFDWLRQRI:LOOLDPV·VYLHZLVZRQGHUIXOO\SXWE\1DNXO .ULVKQDLQWKHIROORZLQJ
WHUPV ¶the world, Williams thought, is full of temptations to take simple moral 
views³HYHU\WKLQJ IURP ´ERPE ,UDTµ  WR ´PD[LPL]H WKH JRRGµ³because the longer 
route of self-understanding and critique is hard, uncertain and risky. If philosophy 
FDQKHOSXVZLWKDQ\RIWKLVLWZRQ·WEHEHFDXVHLWGLVFRYHUVDIRUPXODWR UHSODFHWKH
traditional sources of moral understanding « but because it helps to improve the 
reflective self-understanding of those who have more, much more, to their lives than 
SKLORVRSK\· .ULVKQD  *HXVV WKLQNV WKDW ORRVHQLQJ WKH KROG RI VXFK D YLHZ RI
HWKLFVPDWWHUV SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHLWIRUPVWKH¶ WDFLWEDFNJURXQGRIWKLQNLQJDQGGHEDWH·
LQ WKH PRGHUQ ZRUOG +HQFH KLV LQVLVWHQFH WKDW JHWWLQJ RXWVLGH HWKLFV LV ¶DQ
H[FHSWLRQDOO\JRRG ZD\WRFRQWULEXWH WRIXUWKHU KXPDQHQOLJKWHQPHQW· D  
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make our thoughts out of nothing; they come in part from what is around 
XVDQGZHKDYHDYHU\SRRUJUDVSRIZKDWWKHLUVRXUFHPD\EH·:Llliams 
2007c, 327). Yet this appreciation of the limits of our philosophical 
understanding does not lead Williams or Geuss to hold that we must 
therefore abandon the hope of achieving any kind of more reasoned 
comprehension of our commitments (or indeed ourselves), even if they 
think it should give us pause. It does, however, force us to pose some 
potentially unsettling questions. Thus Geuss insists that once we accept 
WKDW¶WKH&DUWHVLDQSURMHFWRIVHWWLQJDVLGHHYHU\WKLQJZHNQRZDQGYDOXH
and starting ab nihilo to build up our own views about the world on a 
certain and incontrovertible base that owes nothing to social conventions 
LV XQZRUNDEOH·, WKH PRVW SHUWLQHQW TXHVWLRQ ZH KDYH WR DVN LV ¶WR ZKDW
extent is it possible for us to free ourselves from our own illusions and 
ZRUN RXU ZD\ WRZDUGV D UHDOLVWLFRU DW OHDVW PRUH UHDOLVWLF ZRUOGYLHZ·
(Geuss 2010c, x). Attaining such a worldview is the basic precondition of 
making any sense of our lives here and now.  
 Williams and Geuss both grappled with this question in some detail and 
recognised that it had important ramifications for the dominant form 
political philosophy had taken in the late twentieth-century, what 
Williams called 'political moralism' and Geuss 'politics as applied ethics'. 
As they saw it, this approach holds that politics has its theoretical and 
normative foundation in some external non-political moral system or set 
of values which then provide the justification for a particular form of 
political life. In liberal political theory this often takes the form of relying 
upon something like a neo-Kantian account of the autonomous individual 
and from that justifying specifically liberal institutions and practices. 
Politics is grounded in morality and political philosophy is but a sub-
branch of moral philosophy. Yet if morality cannot be all it has purported 
to be not only does this undermine traditional moral philosophies, it also 
throws into severe doubt any political theory that takes itself to be 
grounded in those philosophies. Accordingly, one of the reasons why 
politics cannot be applied ethics is because ethics cannot be applied ethics. 
If we continue to think that politics is a form of 'applied ethics' then the 
problems that we encounter in making sense of morality are only going to 
replicate themselves at the level of politics. 
 So how should we understand politics and our political commitments if 
we accept that they are not grounded in an ahistorical, objective, universal 
morality? And how might we stabilise our political beliefs without falling 
into a crude relativism or a nihilism of political abandonment?  
 From the 1980's through to his death in 2007, Richard Rorty offered his 
own contentious anti-foundationalist response to this question which he 
called liberal ironism (Rorty 1989). To be a liberal ironist is to be someone 
who is fully aware of the contingent nature of their beliefs, that they 
cannot be universally justified to all people, but who manages to cling to 
them by adopting a spirit of ironic wonder. Neither Williams nor Geuss 
were satisfied with Rorty's answer, yet it haunted them both. In the last 
8 
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decades of his life Williams made several attempts to distinguish his 
position, both philosophically and politically, from Rorty's: Rorty is one of 
the main 'deniers', those who reject that truth has any value, that Williams 
sought to refute in Truth and Truthfulness, and liberal irony is the object of 
some scorn in In the Beginning was the Deed.13 Geuss, who admits that he 
spent more time thinking about Rorty than anyone else outside his small 
circle of intimates, characteristically focuses more on his political 
differences with Rorty, though those seem underlined by a worry that 
there might be a connection between a rejection of traditional 
philosophical endeavours and endorsing American patriotism (Geuss 
2010d). The lack of seriousness with which most moral and political 
philosophers have taken Rorty's anti-foundationalism stands in contrast 
with the significance that Williams and Geuss gave him. And one 
plausible reason for this is that Rorty matters to Williams and Geuss 
insofar as they shared his sense of the philosophical problem of making 
sense of ourselves in modernity.  
 What unites Williams and Geuss' response to the problem of anti-
foundationalism was a turn to truthful, realistic reflections on our existing 
practices in the hope that we might be able to find in them adequate basis 
for our beliefs or grounds for ethical, social and political critique. For 
Williams the basic legitimation demand falls out of the very practice of 
politics itself ² rule through legitimated power (Williams 2005, 5). 
Likewise, we can understand basic human rights violations and even 
certain forms of minimal liberalism as supported by basic facts of the 
activity of politics (Williams 2005, 62 ² 74). Geuss' background in critical 
theory led him in a quite different direction: while he warns us that 'what 
is "out there" is usually a farrago of truths, half-truths, misperceptions, 
indifferent appearance, and illusion that needs to be seriously processed 
before one can accept any of it as "real"'(2014a, 140), he still thought that 
with care reality can give us the grounds to engage in the critique of 
power, to see through extant political relations as the rule of one group 
over another, to unmask moral justifications as ideological niceties. We 
have no need for Rorty's ironism if reality gives us enough material to 
work with.  
 We might say therefore that the realist spirit is imbued with a certain 
ethic ² the ethic of truthfulness, a willingness to see our political reality as 
it really is, to not succumb to illusions or wishful thinking, or to imagine a 
greater fit between our needs, interests and values and the world than 
actually exists (Williams 1993, 166 and Geuss 2005c, 223). In this regard,  
                                                                 
13 Williams 2002, passim. The basic problem Williams KDVZLWK5RUW\·VLURQLVPOLHVLQ
KLVLQVLVWHQFHWKDWWKHLURQLVWSRVWXUHLV¶LWVHOIVWLOOXQGHUWKHVKDGRZRI XQLYHUVDOLVP·
because it suggests that you cannot really believe in anything unless you endorse the 
kind of universalist moral grounding we cannot have: (2005, 67). For discussion of this 
see Hall 2014 and Sagar 2016*HXVVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGUHMHFWV 5RUW\·VLURQLVPEHFDXVH
he sees it as the philosophy of bookish intellectuals who ¶GR QRW SUHVVLQJO\ KDYH WR
DFW·In this regard he insists that ¶LURny will not allow the right kind of theoretically 
UHIOHFWLYH HQJDJHG SROLWLFDOSUDFWLFH·E 
9 
Forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
 
part of the value of truthfulness lies with the thought that we have good 
UHDVRQV WR ¶ZDQW WR XQGHUVWDQG ZKR ZH DUH WR FRUUHFW HUURU WR DYRLG
GHFHLYLQJRXUVHOYHV>DQG@WRJHWEH\RQGFRPIRUWDEOHIDOVHKRRG·:LO liams 
2002, 15). Or, in a characteristically more polemic tone, Geuss writes that 
we should 'try to become aware of the extent to which we presuppose 
certain values, and try to make our assumptions as realistic as possible. 
We can, that is, try to be as truthful and truth-loving as possible in 
developing an alternative to the deceitful, hypermoralised views of Plato, 
Aristotle, Kant, and the other major figures in the history of Western 
ethics' (2005c, 230).14 
 In large part it is this ethic of truthfulness that led Williams and Geuss to 
their realist political positions. Vitally, they both insist that a truthful 
account of ourselves and our ethical predicament requires us to endorse a 
more historical philosophical perspective. Here their debt to Nietzsche is 
clear even if his influence plays out in different ways in their work. For 
Geuss, to keep the real world in view requires one to think largely in 
terms of an ideological critique of existing power relations, and to remain 
forever sceptical and vigilant in the face of normative theories that claim 
to be grounded in rationality or morality but are really covers for more 
sectional interests. Precisely because the question of how power actually 
operates in a given context to influence our beliefs is deeply complex, 
*HXVVLQVLVWVWKDW¶RQO\DKLVWRULFDODFFRXQWRIWKHSDUWLFXODUGHWDLOVRIWKH
FDVH ZLOO EH DW DOO HQOLJKWHQLQJ·   0RUHRYHU EHFDXVH SRZHU
influences our ways of orienting ourselves to the world in myriad ways, 
the reflective philosopher must ask why certain issues are not being 
accorded the attention they deserve and why other issues are treated as 
having central significance (2008, 54).15 Here historical reflection is again 
LQYDOXDEOH ¶WKH UHDVRQV ZK\ ZH KDYH PRVW RI WKH SROLWLFDO DQG PRUDl 
concepts that we have (in the forms we have them) are contingent, 
historical reasons, and only a historical account will give us the beginnings 
of understanding of them and allow us to reflect critically on them rather 
than simply taking them for granted· 
 Geuss' politics are difficult to pin down exactly. In part this is because he 
rejects, wholesale, the suggestion that political argument (or criticism) 
must be constructive, effectively insulating him (he thinks) from the need 
                                                                 
14 /LNH *HXVV:LOOLDPVGHQLHVWKDW$ULVWRWOH·VDSSURDFKFDQKHOSXVWRPDNHVHQVHRI
our ethical lives in modernity. However, while Williams is sceptical of the attempt to 
ground ethical life in considerations about human nature ² KHQRWHV WKDW¶LWLVKDUGWR
EHOLHYH WKDW DQ DFFRXQW RI KXPDQ QDWXUH«ZLOO DGHTXDWHO\ GHWHUPLQH RQH NLQG RI
HWKLFDOOLIHDPRQJRWKHUV·SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHWKHSHUYDVLYely reflective nature 
RI PRGHUQLW\KDVVKRZQWKDW¶WKHUHDUHYDULRXVIRUPV RIKXPDQH[FHOOHQFHZKLFKGR
not fit together in one harmonious whole (153) ²  KHLVHTXDOO\DGDPDQWWKDW$ULVWRWOH·V
SURMHFW ¶DW OHDVW PDNHV VHQVH WKDW LW RSHUDWHV VR WR VSHDN LQ  the right corner of the 
ILHOG· 
15 +HQFH *HXVV·V (deeply controversial) FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW 5DZOV· work is ideological 
LQVRIDUDVLW¶GUDZVRXUDWWHQWLRQaway from the phenomenon of power and the way in 
ZKLFK LW LQIOXHQFHV RXU OLYHV DQG WKH ZD\ ZH VHH WKH ZRUOG· E\ JHWWLQJ XV WR IRFXV
LQVWHDGRQRXULQWXLWLRQVRQZKDWLV´MXVWµ  
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to offer fully worked out alternatives to the forms of liberal capitalism that 
Western European and North American states practice, which he so 
vehemently loathes (2014c and 2010a). It is also because of the difficulty of 
adequately grasping the nature of his response to liberalism. In 
¶/LEHUDOLVPDQG LWVGLVFRQWHQWV·*HXVV VXJJHVWV WKDW HYHQ LI WKH.DQWLDQ
inspired strands are non-starters we might be able to vindicate the strand 
RI OLEHUDOLVP ¶WKDW LV DFWLRQ-oriented but reflexively anti-utopian and 
[which] asserts tKDWQRV\VWHPHLWKHURIDFWLRQRUWKRXJKWLVSHUIHFW·F
28). More recently, however, Geuss has dismissed Rawlsian liberalism as 
the political-SKLORVRSKLFDO HTXLYDOHQW RI ´WULFNOH-GRZQµ HFRQRPLFV
GHFODULQJ WKDW LWV FHQWUDO SXUSRVH LV WR DOORZ ¶SHRSOH  who observe great 
inequality in their societies to continue to feel good about themselves, 
SURYLGHG WKDW WKH\ VXSSRUW VRPHFRVPHWLF IRUPVRI UHGLVWULEXWLRQ·$QG
regardless of the gloss that liberal philosophers may put on it (and here 
*HXVV·VFRQGHPQDWLRn seemingly applies beyond Rawls to all self-avowed 
liberals) the fact is that modern capitalism is nothing more than a rotten 
prison.  
   
A prison warden may put on a benevolent smile (Rawls) or a grim scowl 
$\Q5DQG« [but] that is a mere result of temperament, mood, calculation 
and the demands of the immediate situation: the fact remains that he is the 
warden of the prison, and, more importantly, that the prison is a prison. To 
shift attention from the reality of the prison to the morality, the idea ls and 
the beliefs  of the warden is an archetypical instance of an ideological effect 
(Geuss, online).  
 
As a result, even though it is very hard for us to think of politically 
plausible alternatives to capitalism, realists must avoid the temptation of 
distracting themselves from the task of unmasking the power relations 
present in their societies by refining their moral intuitions or setting them 
out in painstaking detail      
 Like Geuss, Williams also urges us to recognise that we must attend to 
KLVWRU\ ¶LI ZH DUH WR NQRZ ZKDW UHIOHFWLYH DWWLWXGH WR WDNH WR RXU RZQ
FRQFHSWLRQV·7KLVLVEHFDXVHVRPHRIWKHHOHPHQWVRIRXUPRUDO
and political outlooks function, in a Wittgensteinian sense, like fixed 
points around which the rest of our arguments revolve. Hence, Williams 
FODLPV WKDW RXU EHOLHI WKDW ¶HYHU\ FLWL]HQ LQGHHG HYHU\ KXPDQ
EHLQJ«GHVHUYHV HTXDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQ·, is best understood not as a 
¶SURSRVLWLRQDOEHOLHI Whan the VFKHPDRIYDULRXVDUJXPHQWV·%XW LWGRHV
not therefore follow that it is sufficient to make as much sense of our 
moral and political outlooks from the inside as we can. Rather, the very 
fact that such fixed points can seem unhintergehbar means that if we are to 
adopt the correct reflective attitude towards our own conceptions we have 
to ask a series of historical questions because such an understanding alone 
FDQKHOSXVWR¶GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWZD\VLQZKLFKYDULRXVRIRXU
ideas and procedures can seem to be such that we cannot get beyond 
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WKHP WKDW WKHUH LV QR FRQFHLYDEOH DOWHUQDWLYH·  16 This is why 
Williams insists that while one cannot in good faith reproach liberal 
political philosophers for not seeing beyond the outer limits of what they 
find acceptable, one FDQUHSURDFKWKHPIRUQRWEHLQJ¶LQWHUHVWHGHQRXJKLQ
why this is so, in why their most basic convictions should seem to 
EH« VLPSO\WKHUH·17  
 Williams also insists that while it is simply a fantasy to think that all of 
our current conceptions, beliefs and forms or arguing for them will 
continue to make sense to us when we take his scepticism about 
philosophy and the morality system seriously, there is equally no reason 
to assume that they will all be discredited. Indeed, as we have argued 
elsewhere (Hall 2014), Williams was adamant that a form of liberalism 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWK-XGLWK6KNODU·VOLEHUDOLVPRIIHDUH[WULFDWHGIURPWKHWKLFN
metaphysical and moral assumptions of previous justifications, could be 
vindicated in modernity (Williams 2005, 1 - 17 and Sagar 2016). This is 
because although Williams was deeply impressed by aspects of 
1LHW]VFKH·V FULWLTXH RI PRUDOLW\ KH UHMHFWHG WKH VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW ¶RXU
growing understanding that the world has no metaphysical structure 
ZKDWVRHYHU·must also discredit liberal ideas of humanitarianism, equality 
and freedom (2007a, 316). Although his scepticism about the morality 
system may have discredited the grounds upon which moralised 
conceptions of liberalism are built, he insists that if we focus on the nature 
of politics and the basic legitimation demand that is internal to it, we can 
find sufficient reason to continue to endorse a version of liberal politics 
because it alone can realistically claim to help people here and now avoid 
ZKDW LV XQLYHUVDOO\ IHDUHG ¶WRUWXUH YLROHQFH DUELWUDU\ SRZHU DQG
KXPLOLDWLRQ· 
 :LOOLDPV·V DWWHPSW WR VNHWFK D UHDOLVW GHIHQFH RI DFWXDOO\ H[LVWLQJ
liberalism generated a rather scornful response from Geuss, who accused 
:LOOLDPVRI SDGGOLQJ DERXW LQ WKH ¶WHSLG DQG VOLPO\SXGGOH FUHDWHG E\
/RFNH-60LOODQG,VDLDK%HUOLQ·D,WLVKRZHYHUZRUWKQRWLQJ
that this is (fittingly) not really best understood as a philosophical dispute 
but as a divergence in political and historical judgement. Geuss insists that 
:LOOLDPV·V SXUSRUWHG RSWLPLVP DERXW ILQGLQJ PHDQLQJ LQ RXU VRFLDO
world is not something that should be taken for granted and muses on the 
                                                                 
16  Geuss claims that philosophers inspired by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 
DFNQRZOHGJH WKDW ¶DW D FHUWDLQ SRLQW LQTXLU\ LQWR WKH UHOHYDQW FRQWH[W RI KXPDQ
WKRXJKW DQG DFWLRQ VLPSO\ VWRSV«>WKLV PHDQV@ WKDW DW VRPH SRLQW ZH ZLOO VLPSO\
encounter facta bruta, either expressions of human volition (will), natural phenomena, 
or human SUDFWLFHVHPEHGGHGLQKLVWRULFDOO\FRQWLQJHQWDVVXPSWLRQV·*HXVVD
182).    
17 7KLVLQIRUPV:LOOLDPVPRUHJHQHUDOFRPSODLQWWKDWPRUDOLVWLFOLEHUDOLVP¶KDVDSRRU
DFFRXQWRULQPDQ\FDVHVQRDFFRXQWRIWKHFRJQLWLYHVWDWXVRILWVRZQKLVWRU\· DQ d no 
DQVZHU ¶WR WKH TXHVWLRQ RI ZK\ ZKDW LW WDNHV WR EH WKH WUXH PRUDO VROXWLRQ WR WKH
questions of politics, liberalism, should for the first time (roughly) become evident in 
(XURSHDQ VRFLHW\ IURP WKH ODWH VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\ RQZDUG·   7KLV FODLP is 
REYLRXVO\ PRUH SUREOHPDWLF ZKHQ WKLQNLQJ DERXW 5DZOV· ODWHU ZRUN WKDQ WKH
approaches favoured by thinkers like Nagel and Dworkin.     
12 
Forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
 
divergence between himself and Williams in this respect by remarking 
WKDW :LOOLDPV ¶ZDV D PDQ ZKR ZDV UHPDUNDEO\ FRPIRUWDEOH LQ KLV RZQ
skin, and who fitted in easily with the existing world of politics and 
academic society, despite his high skepticism about many of the 
purported theorHWLFDOSLOODUVRIWKDWZRUOG·D 
Whether or not this kind of psychological speculation is helpful or 
accurate is not for us to decide, although it is worth noting that Williams 
GRHVQRWGHQ\WKDW¶WKHUHDUHYHU\FRPSHOOLQJWUXHDFFRXQWVRIWKH world 
WKDWFRXOGOHDGDQ\RQHWRGHVSDLUZKRGLGQRWKDWHKXPDQLW\·
and this hardly strikes us as the kind of statement the naively or wilfully 
RSWLPLVWLFZRXOGFRXQWHQDQFH,WLVWUXHWKRXJKWKDW:LOOLDPV·VSROLWLFDO
thought retains a judgment that although we might still be struggling to 
make sense of our moral and political practices the prospect remains of a 
coherent and plausible genealogical account of our politics which is not 
thoroughly debunking. Geuss on the other hand has seemingly fully 
resigned himself to the incoherent and fractured nature of life in 
modernity: 'The only possible meaning you could give your life in the 
twentieth century that is minimally realistic is to resist the social pressures 
towards uniformity and homogeneity in all areas, and to struggle against 
the subordination of human subjectivity and individual life to the 
demands of the maximisation of return on capital ... even a "bitter" 
happiness is not nothing and in any case it is probably all we have left' 
(2014d, 108-10). Such utter pessimism and resignation stands in contrast to 
Williams's political thought, no doubt intentionally so. Nevertheless, the 
importance lies in the fact that these are both attempts to try and make 
sense of our political and moral condition in a disenchanted world. The 
turn to the realities of political life is a response to the fact that we can no 
longer truthfully yearn for an escape from the contingencies of politics via 
the permanence and stability of morality. 
 
*** 
  
We hope that it is by now clear why Williams and Geuss rejected the idea 
that political theorists must begin by articulating an empirically 
abstemious and systematic ideal ethical theory which can then 
mechanically be applied to the political world (Geuss 2008, 6²7). Their 
point is not merely that such an approach fails to operate with the kind of 
experientially grounded conception of feasibility. It is rather that this 
cannot be the right way to think about politics because there is little reason 
to think that we can construct such a pure ethical theory in the first place. 
<HWGHVSLWH WKHLU VFHSWLFLVPRIPRGHUQFRQFHSWLRQVRI ¶PRUDOLW\· DQG WKH
received understanding of its relationship to political practice, it is a 
mistake to think that their political realisms are committed to thinking that 
prescriptive political argument should eschew the use of first-order ethical 
claims or avoid appealing to moral values tout court. In Philosophy and Real 
Politics *HXVVLVHVSHFLDOO\FOHDURQWKLVVFRUH¶QRWKLQJLQWKLVERRNVKRXOG
13 
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be taken to imply that no one should ever allow normative considerations 
RIDQ\NLQGWRSOD\DQ\UROHZKDWHYHULQGHFLGLQJWRDFWSROLWLFDOO\·
99).  
 This comes out especially clearly by focusing on how to theorise in terms 
RI :LOOLDPV·V EDVLF OHJLWLPDWLRQ GHPDQG $V QRWHG HDUOLHU :LOOLDPV
attempts to articulate a freestanding conceptual distinction between 
politics and mere domination which can ground our attempt to reflect 
normatively on politics without making the mistake of thinking that 
politics is reducible to morality. The fact that politics exists to solve the 
first political question, and that the state's claim to be acting legitimately 
rests on the recognition of the governed, enables us to evaluate the actions 
of states from a normative perspective without merely applying an 
antecedently justified ideal moral theory to the political domain. 18 
:LOOLDPV DFFRUGLQJO\ UHMHFWV WKH ¶basic relation of morality to politics as 
being that represented either by the enactment model or the structural 
PRGHO· ZKHUHE\ WKH IRUPHU VHHNV WR HQDFW SULRU PRUDO SULQFLSOHV LQ
practice (such as utilitarianism) and the latter wants to structure politics 
through limiting what counts as rightful political action by pre-political 
moral principles (2005, 2). However, he is also at pains to point out that his 
UHDOLVPUHFRJQLVHV WKDW ¶WKHUH FDQEH ORFDO DSSOLFDWLRQVRIPRUDO LGHDV LQ
politics, and these may take, on a limited scale, an enactment or structural 
IRUP·This follows when we recognise that when we ask whether 
or not we should continue to comply with our state's demands we will 
only answer in the affirmative if we think it satisfies the basic legitimation 
demand. The (often tacit) leJLWLPDWLRQ VWRU\ PXVW ´PDNH VHQVHµ (MS) ² 
and when we ask what makes sense to us here and now we are posing a 
QRUPDWLYH TXHVWLRQ EHFDXVH ¶ZKDW PRVW 06 WR XV LV D VWUXFWXUH RI
DXWKRULW\ ZKLFK ZH WKLQN ZH VKRXOG DFFHSW· 7KLQNLQJ LQ WKHVH WHUPV
therefore rHTXLUHV XV WR HQJDJH LQ ¶ILUVW RUGHU GLVFXVVLRQV XVLQJ RXU
SROLWLFDOPRUDO VRFLDO LQWHUSUHWDWLYH DQGRWKHU FRQFHSWV·  7KH
key point, however, is that these moral ideas have to be understood in a 
ZD\ WKDW LV FRQJUXHQWZLWK:LOOLDPVDQG*HXVV· sceptical remarks about 
the morality system. This means that there is no reason to think that moral 
reasons will always trump all other reasons in play. Moreover, their brand 
of political realism advises against any complacency as to which moral 
ideas we can help ourselves to in the attempt to make sense of our political 
lives, for many of the moral ideas that contemporary political 
philosophers utilise may ¶QRORQJHUGRZKDWWKH\RQFHGLGRUXVVRPHRI
WKHPPD\QRWLQKRQHVWUHIOHFWLRQQRZEHFUHGLEOH· (Williams 2014b, 317). 
Geuss gives an especially illustrative example of such realist theorising 
when criticising political theories which assume that one can start 
theorising by treating certain moral concepts like rights as foundational, as 
Nozick does, without engaging  in an historical analysis of why we think 
this is appropriate here and now (2008, 60²70).    
                                                                 
18 For further discussion see Hall 2015; Sagar 2016; and Sleat 2014.    
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 In addition, they both think that the political credibility of our first order 
arguments depends on whether or not such ideas actually make political 
VHQVHLQRXUKLVWRULFDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W2QFHZHJUDQWWKDW¶SROLWLFVLV
LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHDERXWDFWLRQDQGWKHFRQWH[WVRIDFWLRQ·ZHRXJKWDOVR
WRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDW¶LIRQHZDQWVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRUDQ\NLQGRIJXLGDQFH
for action, one will have to take the specific cultural and historical 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ· Geuss 2008, 11 + 14). In this sense 
political philosophy must appeal to resources that moral reflection cannot 
SURYLGHE\LWVHOI7KLVFRPPLWPHQWGULYHV:LOOLDPV·VXQder-appreciated) 
papers on liberty where he argues that a workable political conception of 
liberty has to be constructed from a non-political conception of freedom 
DQG\HWEH ¶VRFLDOO\SUHVHQWDEOH·ZKHUH WKDWPHDQV LWPXVWEH FRPSDWLEOH
with a realistic assessment of political and practical possibility (Williams 
2001). For these reasons, his realism is committed to the view that social 
and historical interpretation is not an optional extra that political theorists 
can choose to engage if they want to think about how to their pure moral 
principles might be applied. Instead, this kind of reflection plays an 
ineliminable role in the articulation of our political values and 
commitments (Hall forthcoming). This illustrates that moralism is not the 
only vice realists seek to avoid; wishful thinking is just as, if not more, 
politically and philosophically problematic. Williams and Geuss both 
think that they only way to avoid this vice is by reflecting 
unsentimentally, honestly and truthfully, even though the truths about 
our political situation that they seek to reveal sometimes conflict quite 
sharply.  
This is in an important sense to be expected, for such differences are 
properly to be thought of as contestable interpretative claims about the 
political world we inhabit and are exactly the sort of disputes that we 
should recognise and wish to preserve as political. Furthermore, they are 
both good enough philosophers ² and good enough Nietzscheans ² to 
NQRZ WKDW WKHUH LV QR ¶VWDQGSRLQW IURP ZKLFK RXU UHSUHVentations as 
ZKROH FRXOGEHPHDVXUHGDJDLQVW WKHZRUOGDV LQ WKLV VHQVH LW UHDOO\LV·
(Williams 2002, 17). Only very crude conceptions of political realism will 
forget this (Geuss 2005a, 4). We can adjudicate between competing 
interpretations, most notably because some interpretations will not be 
adequately responsive to the demands of truthfulness. The key point is 
that for both Williams and Geuss the endeavour to avoid wishful thinking 
is exactly what realism demands even when doing so is difficult for us 
because it may problematize some of our most cherished political ideas or 
undermine the likelihood that they might be realised any time soon. This 
LPSXOVHLVWKHEHDWLQJKHDUWRI:LOOLDPVDQG*HXVV·UHDOLVPV Their work 
sees the need to be truthful as a  NLQGRI ¶HWKLFDOQHFHVVLW\·ZKLFK QHHGV
intellectual courage (Williams 2002, 15) because they both think that if we 
GR QRW ¶IDFH WKH ZRUOG WUXWKIXOO\ DQ\ KRSH IRU D EHWWHU SROLWLFV ZLOO EH
GRRPHG·:LOOLDPVF  
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 This is why there is some inevitable indeterminacy about precisely what 
this strand of political realism demands. The insistence that we must 
speak truthfully about politics and the role that morality plays in political 
argument is elusive. However, grasping this clarifies why realism cannot 
accurately be characterised as a purely negative, or critically spasmodic, 
reaction to everything neo-Kantian. Rather, at its best realism offers 
glimpses of an alternative, constructive, way of doing political philosophy 
if one is sceptical of the prevailing conceptions of morality we have 
inherited. And while any coherent realism recognises that prescriptive 
realist political arguments will inevitably be ethically laden in various 
ways, contrary to what some of its least charitable critics imply (Erman 
and Moller 2015), this is not something realists should be embarrassed 
about (much less does it show that the realist project is self-refuting).  
 
*** 
 
The impulse that drove Williams and Geuss to adopt variations of realistic 
approaches to understanding politics was not primarily dissatisfaction 
with how little 'impact' normative political theory has had, but rather how 
the realities of politics might help us make better sense of our political 
lives in a modern world in which the traditional certainties of morality 
and religion are no longer available to us. What is at stake is not how 
appeals to reality might close the gap between theory and practice, but 
how (if at all) reality might help stabilise our ethical and political beliefs in 
a disenchanted world. This is an ethical question in the broadest sense. It 
is wrong, therefore, to think that the point of realism is to find an amoral 
perspective from which we can begin doing pure political thinking 
unhampered by morality or normative thinking more generally. The 
driving impulse behind both Williams and Geuss' realism is the attempt to 
find an ethical position from which to reflect on politics once we truly 
recognise the manner in which the frameworks of moral thought which 
we have inherited ² Aristotelian, Christian, Kantian and Utilitarian ² 
cannot make adequate sense of our ethical and political lives. But it 
remains an open question, to which Williams and Geuss had different 
answers, as to what kind of politics we can affirm in the aftermath of such 
a critique.  
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